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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000986

SIPDIS

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DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR  
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR  
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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [ASEC](#) [CD](#) [SU](#)  
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN: JEM NEGOTIATOR CALLS FOR RETHINKING OF  
DPA

Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B  
) and (D)

11. (C) SUMMARY: New political and military realities on the  
ground in Darfur will make the implementation of the Darfur  
Peace Accords impossible, and the International Community  
must consider changing the structure of the current  
agreement, according to the Justice and Equality Movement's  
chief negotiator, Ahmed Tougod, in a meeting with us July 21.  
Tougod highlighted the current military alignment developing  
between supporters of the National Redemption Front against  
Sudanese Armed Forces and forces loyal to Mini Minnawi.  
Tougod also denied the assertion that movements opposing the  
DPA were receiving support from Chadian government sources.  
END SUMMARY.

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DPA CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED  
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12. (C) On July 21, Justice and Equality Movement negotiator  
Ahmed Tougod met with Ambassador Wall to discuss the current  
situation in Darfur from the perspective of the Justice and  
Equality Movement and other groups opposing the Darfur Peace  
Accords. Tougod, who was accompanied by other members of JEM  
and the recently-formed National Redemption Front, told  
Ambassador Wall that members of the Sudanese rebel movement  
in Darfur and the diaspora community consulted with one  
another following the DPA's signing, and concluded that the  
accords did not solve the root causes of the conflict in  
Darfur. Specifically, the DPA failed to realistically  
address the Darfurians' concerns for power-sharing, security,  
and wealth-sharing.

13. (C) For instance, Tougod stated that the power-sharing  
arrangements gave the Darfurians a representation in the  
government of 12 seats in the National Assembly, which was  
far less than the 90 seats they deserved if they were to be  
proportionally represented in the National Assembly. The  
security arrangements lacked clear deadlines for disarmament.  
Finally, there were no indications of individual and  
community-based compensation for victims of the conflict.  
Sudanese rebel groups, as well as the people of Darfur, could  
never accept such an agreement, as it did little to improve

the political and economic inequities that have always existed in the region.

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NEW MILITARY ALIGNMENTS FORMING  
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¶4. (C) Based on these shared concerns over the DPA, according to Tougod, factions opposed to the implementation of the DPA in its current state have formed the National Redemption Front. Their ultimate goal is to convince the international community to reconsider the DPA, and revise the accords to reflect the needs of Darfurians. Tougod told the Ambassador that their meeting would be one of many to present the NRF's case for a revision of the DPA. They would also be approaching United Nations and African Union officials to argue for renewed dialogue on the DPA.

¶5. (C) Ambassador Wall told Tougod and the other members of the meeting that the U.S. views the DPA as the best way to bring peace to Darfur, and is working hard with partners to implement it. He added that parties that continue to stay out of the DPA will only continue to marginalize themselves. Tougod responded by saying that the current accords only marginalize the people of Darfur, which he hoped the international community would understand in the coming weeks.

¶6. (C) Tougod noted that the NRF was facing military opposition from Sudanese Liberation Movement forces loyal to Mini Minnawi, who, Tougod stated, had formed an alliance with Sudanese Armed Forces and Janjaweid militia groups to "wipe out" all opposition to the DPA. Tougod told the Ambassador that while the Minni-GOS alliance initiated the attacks

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against the NRF, the NRF resisted and had successfully pushed Minni out of Northern Darfur. According to Tougod and his colleagues present in the meeting, Minni's forces were only located in specific pockets around Al-Fashir. Therefore, with Minni's role weakened in the region, the implementation of the DPA would become even more difficult.

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DENIAL OF RECEIVING CHADIAN SUPPORT  
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¶7. (C) When asked by the Ambassador about support that the Chadian government was providing to the NRF, Tougod stated that assertions of Chadian military support for NRF operations were completely false, and were rumors spread by Minni to divert attention from real concerns over the DPA. He admitted that the GOC consulted regularly with the NRF, and Daoussa Deby, brother to President Deby, and Mahamat Ali Abdullah, Minister of Territorial Administration, were in frequent contact with Tougod and other members of JEM. He also noted that the GOC provided lodging accommodations members of JEM when in N'Djamena. But there was no Chadian military support to the NRF cause in Darfur. Tougod denied accusations that JEM fighters and GOC officials were actively recruiting supporters from refugee camps in Eastern Chad.

¶8. (C) Conversely, he pointed out that GOS support for Chadian rebel groups was extremely clear, as the Chadian military opposition had free movement in Darfur, and was receiving and equipment and logistical support from Khartoum. Tougod asserted that military engagement between Chadian rebel groups and Chadian military forces along the border was creating the perception that NRF elements were receiving support from Chadian military sources. He added that as the GOS viewed Darfur and Chad as one operational area, support by the SAF for attacks in Darfur and Chad would undoubtedly continue.

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COMMENT

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19. (C) While Tougod denies Chadian military involvement,  
other reports indicate otherwise. Someone needs to get the  
facts.  
WALL